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Abstract

This exploratory study focuses on identifying motivations for religious terrorism and Islamic
terrorism in the United States in particular. Terrorism is a crime of extreme violence with the
end purpose of political influence. This crime is challenging to encounter for its multi-faced
characteristics, the unusual motivations of its actors, and their semi-militant conduct. The
hypothesis of this study asserts that religious terrorists are radicalized by passing from
fundamental to extreme devout agendas, caused by isolation from the dominant society, and
resulted in high potential to impose those agendas by extreme violence. Under the theoretical
framework of subculture in criminology, this study measures how religious fundamentalism is
associated with social isolation of Muslims in the United States. The findings of this study
show a significant relation between religious fundamentalism and social isolationism. Using
a secondary dataset from the DAAS 2003 survey, it is found out that 45% of Muslim males’
social isolationism in the U.S. can be predicted by the level of their religious fundamentalism.
Indicators such as ‘Dawah’ (Islamic identity and missionary), piety, culture, country of
origin, and strain are among the most significant predictors of social isolationism.
Furthermore, the Islamic terror incidents in the U.S. are relatively low compared with other
western countries (i.e. Europe and Israel). That is an indication that the mild social isolation
and positive assimilation of Muslims, despite 9/11, serve as a defense mechanism against
extremization.
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I: Introduction

Terrorism as a form of violence to achieve ideological and political goals has been
performed by actors from different regions and groups throughout history (Hoffman, 2006).
In western societies, and more specifically in the United States, terror was traditionally
carried by groups with an eventual political agenda – characterized mostly by anarchists from
the left and white supremacist from the right (Law, 2009). This study will explore the
relatively new form of terrorism in the U.S. – religious terrorism. Characterized by an
indiscriminating lethality, strong opposition to the West and its values, and extensive
coverage by the media, Islamic religious terrorism is a form of extreme violence that has
transferred from different regions in the world to western countries. By reviewing the
literature on the subject and analyzing religiosity and social aspects of Muslim communities
in the U.S., this current study will attempt to construct a model of religious terrorism to its
components.
Starting at the 1970’s forward, the “new wave” of terrorism, also referred to as the
“religious wave” (Rapoport, 2004), has emerged and extremist Islamist terror groups have
started operating, especially in the Middle-East. This new wave of terrorism spread globally
throughout the decades with Islamic groups conducting the most significant, deadly, and
profoundly international attacks (Rapoport, 2004). The deadly attacks of September 11, 2001
in the United States, which significantly affected the perception on terrorism and terrorism
studies, were the most prominent symbol that the religious terrorism has spread across the
globe, including the U.S. today. Motivated by extremist religious agenda and hatred of the
“Western culture” and its values, Islamic terrorist groups operate in the Middle-East, Europe,
Africa, South-East Asia, and the U. S.
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The 9/11 attacks have also contributed to the anti-Muslim sentiment that grew in the
U.S. ever since. That sentiment diverted the needed focus on the drivers of religious terrorism
to a cultural war. With an approximate population of 1.6 billion Muslims around the world,
the generalization that every Muslim is a potential terrorist solely due to their religious
affiliation deviate from the lines of logic, to say the least. Moreover, the majority of Muslim
migrants are gradually integrating into the western societies to which they have migrated both
socially and culturally (Inglehart & Norris, 2009). Notwithstanding, Muslim migrants do
continue to maintain certain aspects of their culture from their countries of origin in the
countries of destination. Muslim migrants maintain stronger religious identity expressed by
the frequency of attending religious services and the belief of the importance of God. Even
though there is no deep disagreement about democracy as a form of government, Muslim
migrants appear to be highly fundamentalist in comparison to their Western destinations’
culture, on issues of sexuality (mostly against sexual liberation) and gender equality
(Inglehart & Norris, 2009).

Nevertheless, within a minority of the Muslim population from which most are
assimilated in the destination countries, there is a small percent who are not. Within the
discussion over the ‘extreme aspects’ of norms, values, and religious practices of Islam, the
belief system of that small percent does serve as a trigger in the agenda of terrorist groups
who recognize themselves as ‘Islamist’ (in this current study, an umbrella term for people
who believe that Islam must address any form of human existence). Major goals of Islamic
groups are to impose the Islamic Law (hereinafter – Shari’a) including the imposition of a
‘Caliphate’ – a wide anachronistic Islamic State, and severe Shari’a punishments as
blueprints of the criminal system.
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Those principles are fundamentally embedded in the Muslim belief regardless of the
religious denomination (i.e. Sunni or Shiite), or secularity in general (Knapp, 2003). Even
non-violent practices as “Dawah” (Islamic missionary), who carry those principles by
teaching and spreading of Islam, can pave the stepping stones to terrorism, given the allowing
environmental setting. Uncompromising social identification with Islamic way of life and
identity, possibly increases the vulnerability of the major moderate but fundamental part of
Muslims in western societies to the extremism of the minority. The problem is, therefore, that
the radical elements in the Muslim religious belief system can be ignited by other factors,
seemingly social and/or environmental and/ or educational ones that affect the individual,
causing a tendency to terrorize in the name of religious ideology.

The theoretical framework of this current study lays at the criminological sub-cultural
theory (Cohen, 1955; Cohen, 1965). According to this theory, sub-culture is created with an
exclusion of one community from mainstream social structures. The development of inner
social codes and norms can lead to the creation of sub-cultures with oppositional or antisocial values. For most cases, sub-culture is “retreatist” in nature and characterized by
adaptation of criminal behaviors. Theoretically, terrorism as a type of criminal behavior
would be generated by radical religious ideas which lead to the social isolation of Muslims in
non-Muslim societies. Therefore, this theory will serve as the basics to the explanation of
how isolated Muslim communities are riskier as a “fertile soil” of production of potential
individuals involved in radical Islamist terror activities.

The limitations of most previous studies on the problem of radicalization of Muslims
in non-Muslim societies stem from their focus on the components of the religious belief and
how they ignite tendency to terrorism, rather than social, environmental, and educational
factors. Kedar and Yerushalmi (2011) provide an insight to the central Muslim community
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center - the Mosque - and illuminate facts over religious practices and intellectual processes.
However, their research is not focused on non-religious environmental and social elements
(e.g. how the American public education system influences young Muslim community
members).

Studies that do explore the social factors, discuss only the Muslim community and do
not deepen in the characteristics of the relationship with the overall non-Muslim society–
especially in Europe and the United States. For example, Crone (2016) discusses the relation
between ideology and political motivation to the level that the intellectual process of it – even
though elaborated - is somewhat negligible. The discussion is better to be expanded to why
Muslims would even experience social and political differences in Western societies? This
current study will examine the relationship between terror and radical beliefs originated from
Islamic Law, the Shari’a, and apparent non-violent educational aspirations as Dawah which
are carried and spread, inter alia, by social identity. Further, it will attempt to predict social
isolation caused by fundamental religious practices, resulted in extreme violence under the
framework of sub-cultural theory, within Muslims in the United States. Finally, this current
study will discuss policies aimed to address the problem. Therefore, this research seeks to
explore the following question:

RQ: How Muslim religious fundamentalism is associated with social isolation of
Muslims in the United States?
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II: Literature Review
Immigration and Assimilation

Muslims’ integration in Western societies

In order to illustrate the level of social isolation of Muslims in the U.S., it is necessary
to explore their status in the American social census. Muslims came to the U.S. as far back as
the Christopher Columbus journeys in the 15th and 16th Centuries (Lewis, 1990). Duran and
Pipes (2002) describe the trends and reasons of Muslim immigration to America over modern
history. With total 3 million Muslims in the U.S. (as for 2002), two-thirds to three-quarters of
which are immigrants or their descendants. Muslims are considerably younger than the
national average and tend to live in the major metropolitan centers. The relatively low
numbers of Muslim immigrants (only100-150 thousand in 1965) started to increase in the late
1960’s with more permissive immigration legislation. The leading reasons for Muslim
immigration to the U.S. are for refuge, education, economics, and Islamist ambition by a
relatively small portion.

Muslim countries are often ruled by dictators (e.g. Iraq and Iran), faced with war and
violence (e.g. Pakistan, Syria, and Afghanistan). As a result, the most talented and wealthy of
these countries’ citizens move to Western countries, including the U.S. Another major reason
for Muslim immigration to the U.S. is the trend of U.S. colleges in the 1990’s to attract
foreign students by the hundreds of thousends, including many Muslims. Finding better
opportunities for their profession in America than in their countries of origin, many choose to
stay there. This is especially true of Muslim women. Lastly, with accordance to fundamental
Islamic ideas, a small percentage of the Muslim immigrants arrived in America while
despising it and the ideals it represents (Duran & Pipes, 2002). With the ambition to make
changes in the government and to apply the Islamic Law as the law of the land, those
7

Islamists see the U.S.’s status as a superpower as a good opportunity to start their wish for a
change in the world order. Furthermore, they see the freedoms in America as an advantage in
exercising their goals and to freely communicate with their movements (Duran & Pipes,
2002).

Kedar (2006) discusses the cultural gaps which bring Westerners and Muslims to
conflicts and social isolationism of the latter as a result. He mostly presents the problems that
Islamic societies face when exposed to Western values, especially on issues of gender, sex,
and family. As per Kedar (2006), 9/11 is not the cause of the “clash of cultures” between
Islam and the West. This conflict evolved from the 1980’s with trends of globalization and
technology. The conflict between tradition (Islam) and modernism (West) has caused
negative effects on the Muslim population – especially between young and older generations,
and between the general Muslim religious narrative and the West as it seen as ‘Imperialist’,
vulgar, immoral, blatant in sexuality and indifference to religion. Kedar (2006) expresses a
clear relationship between differences in the world view of Muslims in the U.S. and their
exclusion from the American cultural and social liberal mainstream.

Issues of gender equality, sexuality, family, and the status of women stand in
substantial gaps between those of the Islamic tradition and of Western civilization (Kedar,
2006). This gap causes a severe reaction when the values clash. Some of the visible
differences on a daily basis as in dress – strict and fundamentalist for women in Islam, while
western women have the freedom to wear whatever they want. Pregnancy – in the culture of
most Muslim nations, an unmarried girl could be murdered for being pregnant, unlike in
Western culture. Polygamy – due to the inferior status of a woman in Muslim culture, a
Muslim man can take up to four wives as a husband and wife are not equal in marriage.
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Western culture, however, advocates for monogamous marriage as they entail for equal rights
between a husband and wife (Kedar, 2006).

On the extent that Islamic terrorism hypothetically derives from, inter alia, the
assimilation problems of Muslims in Western societies, Inglehart and Norris (2009) asked to
what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the
culture of their new setting? Inglehart and Norris (2009) research followed Islamic terrorism
events in Europe which arose concerns about closed Muslim communities in European cities.
As some of the perpetrators were a second generation of young Muslims, fear was that they
develop sympathies with radical Islamic movements from their countries of origins. As
assimilation theories suggest, Muslim migrants to Western countries do not carry a fixed
cultural manner from their countries of origins, but gradually integrate into the new countries
they immigrated to – the countries of destination. However, divergence theories suggest that
there are still cultural roots that are embedded within the migrating communities. Inglehart
and Norris (2009) conclude that while Muslim migrants in Europe still carry the cultural
values and norms of gender equality, family values, religious fundamentalism, and some
disdain views on democratic values, they are different from their counterparts in their
countries of origins.

Gould and Klor (2016) explore whether the 9/11 events affected the assimilation rate
of Muslims in the U.S. and the association with an increase of their sub-culture. Hate crimes
in the U.S. target Muslims more than any other minorities, with an increase from 28 incidents
in 2000 to 481 in 2001. As a result, Muslim individuals are likely to marry within their own
community and yield higher fertility. Muslim females participate less in labor force, and
lower English proficiency is performed. In short, according to Gould and Klor (2016)
assimilation of Muslims in the U.S. since 9/11 is significantly slowing down. 9/11 “backlash”
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has made the Muslim community in the U.S. more closed and traditional. According to Gould
and Klor (2016), before 9/11 Muslim Americans were on the path of assimilation and
‘Americanization’, but that process was damaged and Muslims started finding shelter from a
hostile environment by attending mosque services more frequently. Gould and Klor (2016)
have found that with the rates of intra-marriage (high), fertility (high), labor-force
participation (low), and English proficiency (low), 9/11 may have a long-term political and
social impact on Muslims’ assimilation in the U.S. Furthermore, Gould and Klor (2016)
assert that extremist groups commit terror attacks in order to awake a “backlash” and by that
to slow assimilation, gain support and identification, and recruit from moderate members of
the minority group (e.g. al Qaeda provoking of America to attack Afghanistan).

Subcultural theory

Since the component of social isolationism is an integral one in the criminological
theory of subculture, it is the theoretical framework of this current study. Subcultural theory
of deviance is mostly recognized with Albert K. Cohen’s study in 1955. Cohen’s (1965)
article ‘The Sociology of the Deviant Act: Anomie Theory and Beyond’ is a revisit of that
work. There, he applies his subcultural theory as a development to the Strain theory of Robert
Merton (1938). Merton’s (1938) discussion of ‘anomie’, an apparent gap between social
“goals” and legitimate “means” to achieve them, brought Cohen (1955) to expand that
approach from the individual’s level to the middle-class group in the urban setting. Thus,
subculture is created when individuals in the same situation of disjunction in achieving social
goals are formed in a group that develops its own goals, norms, and laws. Goals in a society
are relative to its culture. When a subculture is formed, it neutralizes the strain of the
unachievable goals of the dominant culture in which it lives at. This replacement of goals and
norms creates a deviant behavior. Moreover, Cohen (1965) emphasizes that goals should not
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be only material (as in Merton’s strain theory) to create strain and deviance. Alternatively,
strain can be a result of institutional injustice, lack of obtaining respect, and cultural gaps
between ethnic groups and minorities to the dominant culture.
Following subcultural theories that evolved from Cohen’s (1955) work, Pisoiu (2015)
attempts to apply subcultural theory to extremization and terrorism of jihadi and right-wing
groups in Germany. She examines the deviance of those groups by applying the perspectives
of earlier subcultural theories, English school of subcultural theories – Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), and some contemporary theories (Cohen, 1955;
Cloward & Ohlin, 1963; Hebdige, 1994; Williams, 2011). By analyzing four and three case
studies of extreme jihadi and right-wing groups, respectively, Pisoiu (2015) came to the
conclusion that the frustration effect of strain due to disjunction in means and goals was not
significantly observed in her research. However, the findings support the hypothesis of
illegitimate structure thesis along with post-modern subcultural theories regarding cultural
cross-fertilization (Pisoiu, 2015).

Issues in definition of terrorism

Terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, which is even harder to define in the
international spectrum due to different political systems. For the purpose of understanding
how the discussion of this current study eventually relates to practices of terrorism, its
specified elements must be broken down to a comprehensive definition. Schmid (2004)
attempts to bring some order into the elusive and contested concept of terrorism with a
definition composed of 16 elements. According to Schmid (2004), terrorism is:

an (1) anxiety-inspiring method of repeated (2) violent action, employed by (semi-)
(3) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for (4) idiosyncratic, criminal, or
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political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence
are not the main targets. The (5) immediate human victims of violence are generally
chosen (6) randomly (targets of opportunity) or (7) selectively (representative or
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. (8)
Threat- and violence-based (9) communication processes between terrorist
(organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to (10) manipulate the
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a (11) target of terror, a (12) target of
demands, or a (13) target of attention, depending on whether (14) intimidation, (15)
coercion, or (16) propaganda is primarily sought. (p.382)
Following Schmid’s (1988) work, Weinberg et al. (2004) explored the reasons for the
difficulties in defining terrorism as well. Their attempts for reaching a consensus concept of
terrorism have yielded the conclusion that terrorism is hard to define due to political biases,
vast use by media, and issues of “stretching” and “traveling” (e.g. narco-terrorism, cyberterrorism). According to Weinberg et al (2004), Schmid’s (1988) definition is not
satisfactory. The methodology in his work is well designed, however, many elements are not
relevant anymore. Weinberg et al (2004) have asserted that an empirical collection from
academic journals ought to provide a consensual definition: “Terrorism is a politically
motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of
publicity plays a significant role” (Weinberg et al, 2004).

Hoffman (2006) uses a different methodology to define terrorism and argues that
changes in the meaning of the term over the years by its actors and observers caused the
difficulty in defining it. The rationale in defining terrorism is referring to terrorist acts in the
modern era (since the French revolution in 1789) and incorporation of political motive as the
major element of the violent crime. According to Hoffman (2006), all terrorist acts are
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subsequently political. State actors are excluded from the definition as states have power as a
given. The attention to terrorism as a political instrument has significantly changed by the
U.S. and other democratic states after the attacks of 9/11 by radical Islamic actors. As
Hoffman (2011) proposes, 9/11 was a turning-point in how America perceives, defines, and
reacts to terrorism. First, America understood that terrorism is orchestrated by actors with a
purpose beyond the act itself and one that has an “inner logic” to it (Hoffman, 2011). Second,
the psychological effect of 9/11 has proven the advantage of terrorism to spread intimidation,
both among the public and the leadership. Countermeasures, therefore, must aim to address
also that effect besides the physical one. Finally, in the light of the identity of the 9/11 events’
perpetrators and the organization that stood behind them, Americans realized that the liberal
values of democratic and diverse societies multiply the complexity of fighting terrorism.
With the risk of violation of civil liberties (e.g. arrest and investigation of prospective
terrorists due to their country of origin) democratic societies must realize expectations and
understand the vulnerabilities of an open and democratic system.

The definitions that were brought in this section are only few of the many other
scholar definitions. However, those particular ones were chosen as they are comprehensive in
addressing the traits of religious terrorism in particular. The “infidels” victims of radical
Islam as selective targets which serve as a message, the lethality of the attacks, and the
intensification of political opposition motivated by appealing to a deity are all strongly
identify with religious terrorism.
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Islamic Terrorism

Jihad

Islamic terrorism, derives from an extreme interpretation of Jihad, is as the core of the
religious wave of terrorism. Scholarship of radical Islamic terrorism elaborates the concept of
‘Jihad’ in the Muslim religion. Knapp (2003) explores the history of the term to recent days
and how it has been perverted by Muslim extremists as part of their violent campaign against
the West. In his discussion he explores the concept of 'Jihad' as a form of 'struggle' in the
Islamic thought with the purpose of spreading the Muslim belief throughout the world. The
common and agreed components of applying Jihad among the different denominations of
Islam derive from the classic concept of Jihad in the Islamic scriptural sources (i.e. the
Quran). Originated in the 7th century with the creation of Islam, the classic concept consists
of the principles of Jihad as a communal obligation to achieve a unified Muslim realm as
superior to all other faiths, inter alia, through an armed action against the so called “enemies”
of Islam. Jihad is indeed a religious struggle between monotheists and polytheists. However,
extending of Muslim territory does not mean the annihilation of non-Muslims and peace
treaties of limited duration are allowed. Furthermore, use of force against non-Muslims and
especially against Muslims is restricted to the following: (1) threat to ‘Dar al Islam’ (Muslim
territory), (2) aggression against Muslims anywhere, (3) cooperation with the enemies of
Islam (even if Muslim). The difference between Sunni and Shiite lies on the ground of the
identity of the leader of Jihad (Knapp, 2003).

Following the events of post-WWII and the anti-colonial movement, extreme Islamic
leaders and militants initiated an interpretation to the rules of Jihad by appropriating the
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concept to their radical agendas. Extreme Islamic organizations such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, EIJ (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah are among those
who carry the perversion of Jihad into an indiscriminate violent campaign. With the ongoing
narrative and accusation that the West attacks the Muslims of the world, Palestinian land had
been stolen from the Muslims by Israel, and that Saudi-Arabia is occupied by the U.S., they
justify an armed Jihad under the new and unique situation of the Muslim population.
Corresponding with the extreme Islamic medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya, radical Islamists
assert that Jihad has shifted from a communal obligation to an individual one as god is the
current ruler and leader of the struggle. Moreover, Muslim leaders and states who conduct
peaceful relations with the West are apostates and hence a violence against them is justified
(Knapp, 2003).

Dawah

In order to understand the elements of the silent and inner struggle in Jihad, it is
necessary to discuss the term of “Dawah” and how it connects to the idea of
fundamentalism’s potential to become extremism. Originated from the Quran, Dawah is an
intellectual and educational process by which a person is peacefully drawn towards Islam
(French, 2017). It means that the mission of mobilizing Jihad is preceded by (1) deepening
the Muslim’s faith and devotion in his religion as a first phase, and (2) spreading the beliefs
of Islam via educational systems and deeds to the “infidels” (i.e. non-Muslims) with the goal
of proselytizing them (Bukay, 2014). The element that differs Dawah from other religious
educational systems is the strong sense of missionary in it, with the purpose of creating an
Islam-dominated world. In non-Muslim societies, that missionary purpose can be carried out
with a total externalization of the Islamic identity of the individual, including a fundamental
point of view on the scriptural aspects of Islam. This element, therefore, is not characterized
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only by striving for educating as many people as possible, but further with resenting the
“infidels” wherever they are (Bukay, 2014). According to Bukay (2014), the peaceful and
patient preaching of Islam through Dawah actually serves as the base for violent jihad, as it
paves a way to religious terrorism for its strong mobilization and recruitment of youth.

Schmid (2014) makes practical explanations to how that path is reached. Moreover,
he explains that there are no real distinctions between violent and non-violent extremism in
the context of Dawah and jihad. Leaders of Muslim organizations in the West (e.g. the U.K)
are often extremists in their political outlook, even though not violent or preaching to ‘jihad
by the sword’. Those leaders are even collaborative with the western government in order to
ally against Islamic terrorists. However, that collaboration policy is under a great dilemma, as
those non-violent organizations can serve as the entering gate to terrorism for their strong
opposition to domestic cultural and political views (e.g. rejection of democracy and favoring
of Sharia law) (Schmid, 2014). The author makes a significant note that the usually made
distinction between violent and non-violent religious extremism is unacceptable, for the
reason that religious extremism is fundamentally violent.

Despite the clear notion that Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same things, the
Islamic element of Dawah can serve as a substantial drive to extremism. The basis for that
premise is that while most Muslims are not Islamist, large numbers of them are
fundamentalist and take the scripture of the Quran literally (Koopmans, 2013). According to
Schmid (2014), Islamic extremism has one goal only, with either non-violent (Dawah), or
violent (jihad by the sword) means. Therefore, the only difference between Dawah and
violent jihad is of strategy and tactics. Non-violent closed-minded Islamist extremism can be
recognized in a western country by (1) unwillingness to integrate into the host country or (2)
compromising to integrate but with the purpose to eventually establish an Islamic state, (3)
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and by a complete rejection of western core values. All of those are promoted by pushing the
Islamist agenda with Dawah towards ‘Islamization’. The author quotes the global Sheikh and
senior ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ member, Yusuf al Qaradawi, to illuminate on the goals of nonviolent Islamist extremism and Dawah:
“…Islam will come back to Europe for the third time, after it was expelled from it
twice […]. Conquest through Da’wa, that is what we hope for. We will conquer
Europe, we will conquer America! Not through the sword, but through Da’wa”.
Al Qaradawi’s declaration means that Dawah is actually an appropriation of jihad to a
current reality when its violent form is ineffective, but it will be with the success of
Islamization. The uncompromising carriage of social and cultural identity of the fundamental
Muslim individual in a non-Muslim society then, plays a major role in the practice of Dawah.
That practice potentially contributes to social isolation of Muslims in non-Muslim societies,
along with the vulnerability of proneness into extremism.

Trends of religious terrorism

In order to address the definition problem of terrorism, Rapoport (2004) developed a
“waves” system in which the fourth and newest one is the religious wave. According to
Rapoport (2004), terrorism is rooted in modern culture and its characters are distinguished by
eras (even though overlapping). The religious wave started in 1979 with the Iranian
revolution, and the invasion of the USSR to Afghanistan, and is still ongoing. Islam is in the
heart of the wave where Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jewish and more operate in
violence to achieve religious impact. The apocalyptic message of establishing an Islamic state
dictates the narrative of Islamic terrorist groups – therefore, Islamic terrorism is
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internationally spread with potential terrorist cells in Muslim and non-Muslim countries with
the aim to maximize casualties in their attacks (Rapoport, 2004).

Sedgwick (2004) also examines the nature of religious terrorism. He asserts that the
fourth wave has actually started in 1967 after the defeat of Arab armies by Israel in the sixday war. Ultimate aims and immediate objectives of religious terrorism according to him
differ by that the former are religiously formulated, and the latter are almost always purely
political. Religious terrorism is uniquely dangerous as it ultimately aims to appeal to the
sympathy of a deity, a subject of worship, rather than actual sympathizers on a public
manner. The Jews/ Israel are the number one enemy of Muslims, and America is Israel’s
number one supporter, hence America is seen as a great enemy to Islamic terror groups.
Despite the distinction between ultimate aims and immediate objectives, the religious
elements are the main guidelines in the radical Islamic movement’s actions (Sedgwick,
2004).

Over the last few years, a number of perceptional studies have been conducted to
measure how religious terrorism is exercised by extreme Islamic groups, and to discover the
scales of the phenomenon. Furthermore, some studies have examined the general views of the
Muslim population over the literal practices of Islamic Law in respect to the radicalization
and perversion of it. The following paragraphs will discuss those issues.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is an extremist Sunni terror
organization which has been founded in Iraq in 1999. Siebert & Winterfield’s (2016) work of
identifying and structuring the goals of ISIL aimed to discover the objectives of its leaders,
and the appeals of its followers. The qualitative research examined 353 value-relevant
statements from transcripts of interviews with 59 subject matter experts 175 statements
related to goals, values, grievances, and objectives of ISIL from open source statements by
18

ISIL leaders and other open sources on the Internet. The major findings are that ISIL pursues
three main strategic objectives.: Establish a Caliphate in Iraq and the Levant, Expand Islam
and Sharia Law Worldwide, and Recreate the Power and Glory of (Sunni) Islam. Those
objectives demonstrate an actualization of fundamental scriptural Islamic ideas.

On the other hand, Wormald (2013) showed the views of Muslims around the world,
including in Western countries, about the practice of Shari’a Laws. He analyzed interviews
with 38,000 Muslim people from 39 countries which are significantly Muslim populated,
from a wide range of ages. The results indicate that most Muslims believe Shari’a is the
revealed word of God rather than a body of law developed by men based on the word of God.
Muslims also tend to believe Shari’a has only one, true understanding, but this opinion is far
from universal; in some countries, substantial minorities of Muslims believe Shari’a should
be open to multiple interpretations. Religious commitment is closely linked to views about
Shari’a: Muslims who pray several times a day are more likely to say Shari’a is the revealed
word of God, to say that it has only one interpretation and to support the implementation of
Islamic law in their country.
However, although many Muslims around the world say Shari’a should be the law of
the land in their country, the survey reveals divergent opinions about the precise application
of Islamic law. Generally, supporters of Shari’a are most comfortable with its application in
cases of family or property disputes. In most regions, fewer favor other specific aspects of
Shari’a, such as cutting off the hands of thieves and executing people who convert from Islam
to another faith. This comparison between the two types of research reveals the two following
significant notions (1) ISIL is motivated by fundamental Islamic ideas which are generally
accepted in the Muslim world (2) but ISIL radicalizes those ideas to practices which have no
place in the modern world (Wormald, 2013).
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Islamic terrorism in Europe and the U.S.

Following the terror attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, Bakker (2006)
examined the motivations of Islamic terrorists in European states and aimed to: address jihadi
characteristics in Europe; to analyze processes of radicalization and recruitment; to contribute
to a better understanding of the individuals and networks that have been behind jihadi
terrorist activities in Europe (years 2001-2006). Bakker (2006) sampled 242 persons’ social
characteristics from jihadi terrorist networks in Europe (2001-2006) descriptive exploratory
research design. The examined elements are mostly single males that are born and raised in
Europe; they are not particularly young; they are often from the lower strata of society; many
of them have a criminal record. His major findings were that there is no standard jihadi
terrorist, and the picture of the puzzle of jihadi terrorists in Europe is still incomplete. Given
the heterogeneity of this group and the complexity of the networks, it remains to be seen if
we will ever have a clear insight into the characteristics of this group.

Brooks (2011) work on the characteristics of Islamic terrorism in Western countries
aims to analyze the argument that Muslim –Americans represent a serious terrorist threat.
According to Brooks (2011), Islamic terror attacks in Europe by ‘homegrown’ Muslim
terrorists at the middle of the 2000’s and Usama bin Laden’s elimination in 2011 increased
public and institutional concern about counterparts Muslim-Americans. Scholars such as
Hoffman (2010) and Sageman (2009) expressed those concerns as well. However, it seems
that the risk is overstated and mischaracterized. In Brook’s (2011) hypothesis, the three
elements for a viable attack in this manner are: (1) intention by radical Muslim Americans to
plot deadly attacks. (2) Loose intelligence and monitoring by authorities. (3) Militant
proficiency of prospective perpetrators. By examining those elements, Brook (2011)
concludes that there are many obstacles to prove that ‘homegrown’ threat by Muslim-
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Americans is particularly serious and increasing due to lack of evidence that radical practices
generally leads to violence, excessive law enforcement over the threat of terrorism prevents
from showing a clear image of justified arrests, and finally – obstacles in military training for
American residents in purpose of Islamic deadly attacks.

Kaplan (2012) has conducted his own analysis to estimate probability of jihadi terror
operation plotting at a given time. Focusing in the U.S., Kaplan’s (2012) methodology is a
systematic assessment of duration of a terror plot and not only the attack itself, as it is easier
to draw a more reliable image on the threat of terror, as a “terror attack is the last step in a
process that begins when an individual or group decides to commit an act of terrorism”
(Kaplan, 2012). Kaplan (2012) focused on data of recorded indictments, affidavits, and other
publicly available information and found out that there are probably three jihadi terror plots
in the U.S. at any point since 9/11. Furthermore, terror plots motivated by jihadi ideas consist
55% of all terror plots in the U.S. and 35% directed to attack inside the U.S.

A study that has been focused in Europe in the same year shows a different image
with regards to the success of Islamic terrorist plots. Jordan (2012) provides a descriptive
analysis of jihadi terrorist activity in Western Europe during the years 2001–2010. He shows
that Western European countries, especially ones that firmly support U.S. efforts to eradicate
Islamic terrorism (e.g. the U.K.), very much suffer from Jihadi attacks and attempts of attack.
Up until the middle of the 2000’s, Western European countries have taken a permissive
stance towards the appearance of seeds of homegrown jihadi cells, which had already taken
firm root, posing a significant difficulty to counter them in a short period of time (Jordan,
2012). Jihadi terrorism in Europe is lethal as it targets public sites to indiscriminately kill
people. Muslims in Europe are much less assimilated than their counterparts in the U.S.
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(Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010) with higher levels of radicalization. Moreover, jihadists in
Europe have higher accessibility to military training outside the country (e.g. in Pakistan).

Islamic terrorism against Muslims

The focus of this current study is on Islamic terrorism in the United States. However,
it is appropriate to remark that Muslims are the main victims of Islamic terrorism around the
world by a very high percentage (~85%). The illustration of what Islamic extremization in the
countries of origins (i.e. Muslim) means, can illuminate on the potential consequences and
possible seeds of Islamic terrorism due to social isolation in the countries of destination (i.e.
non-Muslim). Helfstein et al (2009) report aim to show the targets of the terrorist
organization al Qaeda with a distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim victims. The
review of al Qaida’s victims in Helfstein et al (2009) reveals that the vast majority of
casualties’ as a result of the jihadi group’ attacks at 2004-2008 are Muslims. With “only”
15% of Western casualties, the report points out the political motive of this religious
terrorism, as al Qaeda excused the targeting of Muslims as acts of fulfilling the rules of
Islamic law against those who are not completely engaged in the opposition of the sinful
West. Also, Helfstein et al (2009) reflect that Islamic terrorism is an expression of perversion
of the Muslim belief as a whole. Those findings help to understand, among other things, the
implications of Islamic extreme violence. With regards to social isolation, those findings can
teach about the potential danger and lethality of Islamic terrorism in western countries, which
are seen as the highest level of “infidelity” and the source of it, in the eye of the Islamist.
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Radicalization

Conceptualizing Radicalization
There is a distinction between Extremization and Radicalization. The main difference
is that radicalization is not necessarily associated with violence, and extremization does.
Since the vast majority of the literature refers to Extremization as Radicalization, this section
will refer to radicalization as a term associated with violence.
Radicalization is an inseparable part in the hypothetical process from a religious
fundamentalism to a social isolation that can result in by terrorism. Therefore, it is an integral
part of this study to discuss that element’s processes among the individual and the group. In
the context of security and terrorism, ‘radicalization’ is generally defined as the continuum of
an organized opinion, representing or supporting an extreme section of a party (Sedgwick,
2010). Scholarly works on terrorism incorporate the concept of radicalization in order to
illustrate what are the motivations of participation in sub-national extreme-violence with the
end of a political imposition.
The present model of the human behavioral concept of radicalization is mainly
characterized by the quest of the individual for personal significance. On this notion,
Kruglanski et al. (2014) build their model of radicalization/ de-radicalization on three main
bases: (1) the motivational component, (2) the ideological component, which is important for
identifying with the subject of motivation, (3) and the social process in which the individual
bases their dynamics and justification to their ideology. With regards to radicalization that
results in extreme violence, post 9/11 research strongly reflects on this phenomenon.
According to that research, ideological radicalization and involvement in terrorism are related
but are also mutually exclusive. Ideological radicalization by itself does not necessarily
ensure terrorism.
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Borum (2011) expounds upon the current theories and models which have been
developed on violent radicalization (i.e. terrorism) and concludes the following: (1)
Radicalization is motivated by more than one cause when factors of broad grievances are the
“push” component. (2) The human’s social environment is the ground where ideologies
develop. (3) Religious belief can serve as leverage to a grievance and vice versa. (4)
Ideological commitment leads to a group affiliation and vice versa. Borum (2011) sees the
engagement in violent radicalization as a “dynamic psychological process” (Borum, 2011)
composed by intellectual and social factors, and its strength is a function of the willingness to
take subversive action.
In order to explain a group radicalization, Crenshaw (2011) set the principle of
organizational psychology as a basis for explaining motivations of terrorism. The author saw
it as an instrument in achieving political influence. Using the theoretical framework of
rational choice, Crenshaw (2011) elaborates on the limitations to a mere ‘free of uncontrolled
considerations’ decision-making processes by terrorists. The hypothesis is that the factor of
radical ideas leading to social isolation is the one that distinguishes terrorists from other
groups, both socially and politically. Moreover, radicalism sets the agendas, recruitment
process, goals, and the “clandestine life in the underground” of the terrorist group (Crenshaw,
2011). This uniformity and totality are achieved by diminishing the individual’s aspirations
and replacing them with the group’s collective ideas, by using intensive psychological means.

The psychological/ intellectual motivations

The 9/11 Commission Report (2002) analyzes the sequence of events that led to the
deadly attacks on the U.S on September 11th, 2001 which took the lives of 2,973 people. The
report provides a thorough view of the ideological motivations that were promoted by Usama
Bin-Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda at that time. 9/11 attacks preceded with the publication of
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'fatwas'- Islamic religious orders- by Bin-Laden in the late 1990's. According to the report,
those fatwas called for a collective war on the United States of America and the State of
Israel, America's ally. As a persona who gathered a significant appeal in the Islamic world,
Bin-Laden used his power to incite and promised the restoration of "pride to people who
consider themselves the victims of successive foreign masters" (The 9/11 commission report,
2002). Moreover, the report strongly points out that Al Qaeda's war is aimed at Christians and
Jews everywhere.

In their study, Kedar and Yerushalmi (2011) focus on the radicalization in mosques
across the United States. A survey they conducted in 100 mosques in 15 states, found that
violent jihad, financial support for terror, ‘Caliphate’ (Islamic state) in the U.S., and praising
terror against the West are significantly promoted in American mosques by Islamic preachers
and even by known Shari’a scholars (on different levels of severity). “The study found a
statistically significant association between the severity of violence-positive texts on mosque
premises and Shari‘a-adherent behaviors” (Kedar & Yerushalmi, 2011). Among their
findings of Shari’a-adherent behaviors there were 47% of severe segregation (of gender) in
prayers; 100% promotion of violent jihad in mosques with extreme textual materials; 98%
promotion of 'caliphate' in the U.S in the same type of mosques by imams.
Moghaddam’s (2005) study strengthens Kedar & Yerushalmi’s (2011) findings with a
structured theoretical framework of five stages of an individual’s “path” in radicalization,
causing in violent behavior – the “staircase metaphor”. In principle, he asserts that
radicalization is pinned in moral and psychological factors ignited by social imbalances –
“commitment to the terrorist cause strengthens as the new recruit is socialized into traditions,
methods, and goals of the organization” (Moghaddam’s, 2005). By using principles in
psychology, Moghaddam (2005) explains that an individual who is in the path towards the
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final stage of radicalization sees the act of terrorism, or the destruction of others, as the only
option. The four other stages or stairs are factors of social strain and the search for coping
with that strain (Moghaddam, 2005).
Wilner and Dubouloz’s (2010) purpose in their work on ‘homegrown terrorists’ was
to investigate the emerging trend of radicalization among Muslim residents of Western
countries, focusing on the individual’s processes that are associated with the jihadi
radicalization of Westerner. Beyond the structural theories, or step-like processes (e.g.
Moghaddam’s “staircase metaphor”), they suggest an interdisciplinary approach to explain
radicalization in Western society. The psychological/educational theory of Transformative
Learning is a key in explaining the process of how a Western resident comes to identify with
radical Islamic ideology.

Wilner and Dubouloz (2010) bring multiple of examples of homegrown Western
terrorists following jihadi agenda since 9/11. They discuss three precursors of homegrown
radicalization: (1) Socio-political alienation – lack of integration of Muslims in their Western
societies and a social isolation as a result. (2) Religiosity and globalization – the radical
messages of uprising religious oriented and transnational terror organizations (e.g. al Qaeda
in the 2000’s) is intrinsically spread via trends of globalization. As a result, they reach
individuals from the same cultural identity in western countries who experience tension under
a non-religious environment and reaffirm that identity threat with radicalization. (3) Reaction
to foreign policy - western jihadists are motivated by perceived injustices taking place against
Muslims around the globe as propagated by Islamic terrorist leaders. The cognitive process
support to these cursors is the psychological Transformative Learning theory (Wilner &
Dubouloz 2010). In general, the individual’s meaning schemes and meaning perspectives
experience distortions. Therefore, they no longer fit their current reality results in critical

26

reflection of these distortions and eventual process of transformation reflected in novel
behavior.

The socio-political motivations

With the approach that radicalization is mainly a byproduct of environmental factors,
Crone (2016) attempts to challenge the common opinion that radicalization is a process
mostly driven by religious ideology, but it could be better understood as an outcome of a
socio-political atmosphere. The aim of the empirical section in Crone's (2016) study is to
address some of the limits in former scholar works in conceptualizing radicalization. Crone
(2016) focuses on an extreme Islamic 'milieu' in Copenhagen, Denmark, and finally argues
that: (1) eventually, extremist ideology is figured in political violence; (2) preceding
embodied skills of violence is more often a precondition to engage with extremist groups and
to adopt extremist opinions.

The socio-political motivations to radicalization leading to Islamic terrorism are also
emphasized in a study by Stern (2016). Having in fact young Arabs joining ISIL, Stern
(2016) explains that what persuades the young recruits to join the terror organization is its
radical nature. But those individuals are driven by social factors rather than ideological/
religious ones. Sadly, joining ISIL bring those young recruits a sense of belonging and selfsignificance that they could not find in their societies. According to Stern (2016) support for
violent activism indeed correlates with sense of social marginalization and isolation. ISIL’s
recruitment tactics also contribute to this phenomenon to occur by promising to satisfy a
quest for significance by fulfilling the purpose of the Caliphate (the Islamic State). This
contrast between the phenomenon of the majority of young Arabs opposing ISIL’s and its
aims from one hand, and young Arabs persuades by its radicalism on the other, emphasizes
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how ISIL’s negative drives are not core values among a significant layer in the Muslim
population.

Warrick (2016) took a wider view in his study on the topic of recruits of young
Muslims to ISIL. He concentrated on how overwhelming majorities of Arab teens and young
adults view ISIL in recent years. He conducted an Empirical – quantitative and qualitative
study of 3,500 18-24-year-old Arabs through a Poll based on face-to-face interviews. He
found out that young Arabs are both increasingly fearful of the terrorist group and less
swayed by its propaganda, compared with previous years. More than half the participants
ranked the Islamic State as the number one problem facing the Middle East.

Post-9/11 anti-Muslim sentiment as a contributor to radicalization
In-depth to the environmental factors to radicalization, Powell’s (2011) work is an
exploration of the relationship between terrorism and the media. With regards to sub-cultural
implications, this work shows the influence of the media on how different groups in a society
think of each other. Furthermore, biases against a certain out-group could hypothetically
widened the gap between them and the dominant society, contributing to their possible social
isolation and eventual radicalization. To examine a hypothesis of Muslims as enemies in the
American public mindset, Powell (2011) presented a media-framing analysis of the 11
Islamic terrorist events in the U.S. between 2001 and 2011. Relative to Wilner and
Dobouloz’s (2010) discussion of the reaction to an unjust foreign policy as a catalyst to
radicalization, Powell (2011) discusses the American media coverage of terrorism since the
9/11 attacks. The article emphasizes the principle by which the media follows the public
interest rather than objective reporting, and targets stories especially when they characterized
as international terrorism (vs domestic) and when the actors are affiliated as Islamic. The
media in this instance has created a linkage between terrorism and Muslim actors in the
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public’s mindset by dramatizing reports of Muslim actors’ vs domestic ones in the
description of individuals and motivations, increasing a public anti-Muslim sentiment.
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III: Methodology
The aim of this exploratory study is to understand how cultural and religious
differentiations affect extremization and proneness to extreme violence by the group of
minorities, when social isolation under the criminological theoretical framework of subculture is the proxy measure. The primary focus is to examine social isolation of minorities in
Western societies, and Muslim immigrants in the U.S in particular. The study will examine
factors such as, social integration and assimilation (e.g. sense of identity, employment,
language, and education), and religious fundamentalism as drivers to radicalization, with
accordance to the principles and interpretation of ‘Jihad’. Using a secondary dataset, the data
are analyzed to answer the following research question: How is religious fundamentalism
associated with social isolation of Muslims in the United States? The Null Hypothesis for this
study is Ho: ‘There is no statistically significant association between religious
fundamentalism and social isolation of Muslims the United States.
Sampling
To explore this question, this current study will use a secondary Database collected by
face-to-face interviews in Baker et al Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS), conducted in
2003 (see Appendix ‘A’ for procedures). Accordingly, this current study is designed as a
quantitative secondary analysis. The unit of analysis in DAAS 2003 is of all adults aged 18
and older living in households in the greater Detroit metropolitan area who self-identified as
Arab or Chaldean (Catholic Christian Arabs originated in Iraq) (n= 1,016). The sample size
allows to include a vast representation of a contemporary Muslim community, which consist
of 422 respondents of the total 1,016, in a modern American metropolitan. The questionnaire
(see Appendix ‘B’) asked about the experiences of Arab Americans since 9/11inter alia:
Social trust; Confidence in institutions; Intercultural relationship. Also, the survey collected
data on the respondent’s characteristics such as: Frequency of religious participation;
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Education; Citizenship status; Language spoken at home; views on homosexuality and
abortion.
Instrumentation and Operationalization
Variables Recoding and Construction
The current study variables are operationalized for a multivariate regression analysis.
Nine independent variables are predictors of one dependent variable. Two control variables
(anti-Muslim sentiment, strain) are incorporated in the model. The following are the
independent variables that demonstrate a religious fundamentalism and are predictors of
social isolation of Muslims in the U.S: (1) Sociopolitical outlook; (2) piety; (3) culture; (4)
importance of god; (5) secular education; (6) country; (7) family; (8) materialism; (9) Dawah.
The dependent variable is social isolation. Lastly, there are two control variables: (1) antiMuslim sentiment and (2) strain. The explanations for each variable setting, including the
description of independence of the IV’s, appear in the tables on pages 34-37.
All variables are continuous and at the interval level of measurement, in order to fit
the statistical test of multivariate regression correlation. Since the DAAS 2003 constructed
for the Arab community in Detroit, included Muslims, Christians (Chaldean), males and
females, the data are filtered by the respective variables in order to measure Muslim
respondents only.
The secondary data in DAAS 2003 is appropriated for the variables in this current
study by a recoding technique. In order to transform the relevant DAAS 2003 variables to be
made continuous, each was recoded into a dichotomous variable when value '1' indicates
presence of the phenomenon checked by response, and value '0' indicates that there is none
(e.g. '1' for 'religiously fundamentalist' and '0' for 'not religiously fundamentalist' in the
religious fundamentalism affiliated variables). Finally, composite variables were created by
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computing across the relative dichotomous variables to make a summary variable where high
scores indicate a greater level of the phenomenon.
For example, the independent variable ‘Piety’ in this current study represents the
cultural gaps that can cause a conflict with the social norms of the destination country, and
thus a potential factor of social isolation. Issues of religious identity, sexuality, and
absolutism in the worship of God are elements in measuring levels of piety. All the more so
when related to religious issues in the Islam and “Dawah”.
Accordingly, variable ‘F12F’ in DAAS 2003, indicates how much the respondent
justifies premarital sex in the scale of 1-10 when ‘1’ is ‘Can never be justified’ and ‘10’ is
‘Can always be justified’. The value ‘1’ in ‘F12F’ is then recoded to ‘1’ in ‘Piety’ and all the
other values in ‘F12F’ are recoded to ‘0’ in ‘Piety’. The same process is applied to all other 6
variables of DAAS 2003 which are affiliated with ‘Piety’, so the level of measurement of
‘Piety’ is an interval of 0-7. The 7 DAAS 2003 variables of ‘Piety’ are then computed as
follows: ‘Piety’ = D16A (religious identity to the public) + D16B (religious identity as social
factor) + C15 (absolute guidelines about good and evil) + F12E (drinking alcohol) +F12F
(premarital sex) + F12G (homosexuality justification) + F12H (abortion).

Factor analysis
In order to check that the constructed variables soundly load together, the variables
went through a rigorous process of factor analysis. By that analysis, it has been found that in
the variable ‘Piety’ the sub-variables ‘alcohol’, ‘premarital sex’, ‘abortion’, and
‘homosexuality’ stand for themselves as strong factors to ‘Piety’. The other sub-variables
‘religious identity in public’, ‘religious identity as social factor’, and ‘good or evil absolute
guidelines’ load together to another factor. As a result, it is appropriate to relate the findings
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about religious identity to ‘Dawah’ and to create another independent variable under this
factor. See Appendix ‘C’ for the results of the original ‘Piety’ factor analysis.
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The following tables detail the recoding for each variable and the construction of this current study’s new variables, in accordance with the Literature Review.

LEGEND
NEW VARIABLE
variable recoded for this study
DASS 2003
original variable from DAAS 2003
LABEL
description of variable's context
VALUE & ASSIGNED "old" values from DAAS 2003 and the
VALUE
recoded binary value in this study,
respectively
ASSOCIATION WITH explanation to why that variable was
LIT. REVIEW
chosen and created as a
measurement to the hypothesis and
research question
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES – RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM
NEW VARIABLE

SOCIO-POLITICS

GOD IMPORTANCE

DAWAH

PIETY

MATERIALISM

FAMILY

SECULAR EDUCATION

CULTURE

COUNTRY

DAAS 2003
C1
C36D
C36E
D19D
F2
H1
H2
H3
H11A
C12
D17_01
D17_02
D17_05
D17_10
C13
D16A

LABEL
VALUE & ASSIGNED VALUE
social & political outlook
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
american media bias israel
1=1/ ELSE=0
american media bias palestine
3=1/ ELSE=0
supporting palestine
1=1/ ELSE=0
governance priorities
1=1/ELSE=0
U.S involvement in the middle-east
5=1/ ELSE=0
establishment of palestinian state
1=1/ ELSE=0
israel as fulfillment of profiecy
5=1/ ELSE=0
not feeling home in america due to its support of israel
1=1/ ELSE=0
services attendance
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
attending friday prayers
1=1/ ELSE=0
quran studying
2=1/ ELSE=0
daily prayers
5=1/ ELSE=0
telling others about faith
10=1/ ELSE=0
god importance in life
8-10=1/ ELSE=0
religious identity to the public
1,2=1/ ELSE=0

D16B

religious identity as social factor

1,2=1/ ELSE=0

C15
F12E
F12F
F12G
F12H
B9
B10
B11
F11A
E6
E6A
F12A
F12C
F12G
E7

absolut guidelines about good and evil
drinking alcohol
premarital sex
homosexuality justification
abortion
use of computers
use of computers frequency
use of internet
emphasis on money and materials possesion
marital status
living with a partner (not married)
divorce justification
women in workforce justification
homosexuality justification
secular education level

1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
5=1/ ELSE=0
2-9=1/ 1=0
2-9=1/ 1=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
2-9=1/ 1=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1,2=1/ ELSE=0

D17_04

sending children to religious classes

4=1/ ELSE=0

F10
E9
E10_CKPT
E10B
E10C
F12D
D17_06
D17_07
D17_08
D17_09
E2
E2D
E3
E4
E4A

religious school subsidise
foreign language spoken at home
arabic spoken at home
newspapers reading in arabic
letters writing in arabic
gambling
marrying a muslim
fasting
wearing hijab
wearing religious symbol
country of birth
U.S citizenship
mother's country of birth
father's country of birth
father's U.S citizenship

1,2=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
6=1/ ELSE=0
7=1/ ELSE=0
8=1/ ELSE=0
9=1/ ELSE=0
2-9=1/ 1=0
5=1/ ELSE=0
2-9=1/ 1=0
2-9=1/ 1=0
2-9=1/ 1=0

ASSOCIATION WITH LIT. REVIEW
This variable represents religiousity as a factor to socio-political views.
Opposition to Israel, criticism of America's "imperilaism", and
fundamentalist governance as part of Islamic doctrine are examples for
translation of conservative religious and cultural narrative to sociopolitical stance.

The level of God's importance in someone's daily conduct indicates the
priority of religious aspects over others in their social life. The activities
and the reflections that associate with God are measured by frequency
of practicing prayers, studying of religious texts, and public rhetoric
about God. It is a significant measurement especially in the U.S. where
there is a cultural separation between God and state.
Absolute and fundamental recognition with Islam. The belief that it
should be spread evereywhere, regardsless of current society's values
and political preferences, in order to mobilize the further agenda of
Islamic state. Chracterized with closed-minded attitude to the notion
that people are allowed to choose their belief and religious practices, if
there are any.
Cultural gaps can cause a conflict with the social codes of the
destination country. Issues of religious identity, sexuality, and earthy
pleasures conflict with fundamental Islamic beliefs on how a human
being should conduct.
Indicator of opposition to culture of consumption and capitalism. The
West promotes and development of technology, as so as use of internet
as a free medium of communication and information consumption.
Intra-marriage are an indicator of social and cultural closeness. Also, an
unmarried woman is seen as a deviant in fundamental Muslim view.
Women's labor is percieved as undignified and homosexuality as
divorce are unacceptable according to fundamental Islam.
Western education stands with opposition to many ideas in
fundamental Islamic scholarship. Islamic preferences are of studying
the Quran and the Hadith rather than "apostate" secular education of
the West
Execive use of original language in a destination country as an indicator
to lack in assimilation. Mandatory head cover for women and rigorous
wearing of Islamic symbols in public as indicators to Islamic
fundamentalism.

INTERVAL 0-9

INTERVAL 0-7

INTERVAL 0-3

INTERVAL 0-4

INTERVAL 0-4

INTERVAL 0-5

INTERVAL 0-3

INTERVAL 0-9

Country of origin and U.S. citizenship status as indicators to how
conservative the person is about Islam. There are Arab countries which
are more culturaly and religiously fundamental than others.
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INTERVAL 0-5

DEPENDENT VARIABLE – SOCIAL ISOLATION
NEW VARIABLE

SOCIAL ISOLATION

DAAS 2003
A2
C3
C5
C6
C8
C9
C11
C17
C19
C20
C23
C34A
D9
D10B
D10C
D12B
D12C
D19B
B2A
B2C
B4A
B4B
B6
B12A
D19A
E8
F4
H9

LABEL
living area
vote for presidential elections
public meetings attendance
club/ organazational meetings attendance
visiting different race home
visiting different neighborhood home
volunteer
activity in art organization
activity in parents/ school support association
activity in business association
mosque attendnance
trust different groups of people
identity as 'arab american'
being arab american as factor to social life
identification with other arab americans
being muslim as factor to social life
identification with other muslims
marrying arabs
watch national news on tv
watch arabic news on tv
read arabic newspapers
arabic newspapers published outside the U.S
arabic programs on sateilite
internet news items in arabic
arabic speaking importance
U.S military service
pride in being american
feeling at home in america

VALUE & ASSIGNED VALUE
4-9=1/ ELSE=0
5-9=1/ 1=0
0-2,998=1/ ELSE=0
0-2,998=1/ ELSE=0
0-2,998=1/ ELSE=0
0-2,998=1/ ELSE=0
0-2,998=1/ ELSE=0
3-9=1/ ELSE=0
3-9=1/ ELSE=0
3-9=1/ ELSE=0
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
1,2=1/ ELSE=0
3-9=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
5-9=1/ 1=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
1=1/ ELSE=0
5-9=1/ 1=0
2-9=1/ 1=0
3-9=1/ ELSE=0
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ASSOCIATION WITH LIT. REVIEW

In general, the sub-variables of Social
Isolation are indicators of unsocial
behavior, lack in assimilation in a
western country, and mobilizers to
formation of a sub-culture. Those subvariables examine levels of carriage of
cultural manners from the countries of
origin, (lacking in) English proficiency as
an indicator of assimilation, intramarriage, type of participation in social
activities (mosque attendance or nonMuslim organizational meetings).

INTERVAL 0-28

CONTROL VARIABLES – ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT & STRAIN
NEW VARIABLE

A/M SENTIMENT

STRAIN

DAAS 2003
C34C
C36A
C36B
D10D
D21A
D21B
D21C
D21D
D21E
H6
H7
H8
H10
H12
H17
C26
C27
C29
C30
C31
D3
D8
E14
E15
F5
F6
G1B
G1D
G1G
H15

LABEL
trust white people
biased U.S media religion
biased U.S media Islam
arab americans not respected
abuse due to ethnicity
threatening words due to ethnicity
physical attack due to ethnicity
vandalism due to ethnicity
loss of employment due to ethnicity
post 9/11 bad experience
post 9/11 show of support
post 9/11 worrisome
post 9/11 feeling at home in america
post 9/11 sense of safety shaken
post 9/11 relations with police
confidence in public institutions
confidence in legal system
confidence in the police
confidence in federal government
confidence in political parties
employment status
employment capacity
income
health insurance
america as land of equal opportunity
income differences in the U.S
nervousness
hopelessness
depression
muslims fairly trialed for terrorism accusations

VALUE & ASSIGNED VALUE
2-9=1/ 1=0
3-9=1/ 1,2=0
3-9=1/ 1,2=0
1,2=1/ 3-9=0
1=1/ 5-9=0
1=1/ 5-9=0
1=1/ 5-9=0
1=1/ 5-9=0
1=1/ 5-9=0
1=1/ 5-9=0
5-9=1/ 1=0
1,2=1/ 3-9=0
1=1/ 5-9=0
1,2=1/ 3-9=0
1=1/ 2-9=0
3-9=1/ 1,2=0
3-9=1/ 1,2=0
3-9=1/ 1,2=0
3-9=1/ 1,2=0
3-9=1/ 1,2=0
2-99=1/ 1=0
1,3-9=1/ 2=0
1-5=1/ 6-99=0
5-9=1/ 1=0
3-9=1/ 1,2=0
1,2=1/ 3-9=0
1,2=1/ 3-9=0
1,2=1/ 3-9=0
1,2=1/ 3-9=0
5-9=1/ 1=0
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ASSOCIATION WITH LIT. REVIEW

The control variable of antiMuslim sentiment is
significantly relevant to this
current study as the survey was
performed in 2003, post 9/11.
Since then, hate incidents
INTERVAL 0-15
towards Muslims have
increased in the U.S. Therefore,
anti-Muslim sentiment can
serve as an alternative factor to
social isolation.

Strain is a vital element in the
criminolgical theory of subculture. Muslims in the U.S are
demographically not affiliated
with the higher classes in
society and fit the population
INTERVAL 0-15
that could struggle with strain
due to disjunction of means to
achieve social goals. Therefore,
strain among Muslims in the U.S
can serve as an alternative
factor to social isolation.

Data analysis
In the attempt to determine a formula that describes how elements of religious
fundamentalism correlate and predict social isolation, the hypothesis was tested by a linear
model of statistics of multivariate regression correlation. The variables were selected from
the DAAS 2003 with consistence to social isolation, religious fundamentalism, anti-Muslim
sentiment, and strain. The data were processed using the GNU PSPP version 1.0.1 program
for statistical analysis of sampled data.
Secondary analysis of data design was selected for the following reasons: (1) It is
appropriate to test the Null Hypothesis Ho: ‘There is no statistically significant association
between religious fundamentalism and social isolation of Muslims the United States’ by
using non-manipulated observations of individual’s characteristics and beliefs on religion and
social affiliation. (2) The random sampling of the original work allows the outcome
probability to be generalized to other Muslim communities across the U.S. and possibly other
Western societies.

In order to meet the IRB requirements to protect human subjects in social science
research, measures of protections have been taken at this current study. The administrators of
the DAAS 2003 study have provided that subjects examined in the dataset are not identified
by name or any other official identity mean. Also, the original study (DAAS, 2003) includes
an informed consent from the participants. Moreover, ICPSR, which where the data are
published, emphasizes confidentiality and minimization of disclosure risk in preparing and
releasing data sets. The public-use data files of the DAAS study are available for the authors
to access because their institution, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, is an ICPSR
member.
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IV: Results
Regression
In order to predict the DV (social isolation) based on the 8 IV’s (which later became 9
after a factor analysis) of religious fundamentalism, a multivariate linear regression test was
calculated on PSPP. The following results were obtained.
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A significant regression equation was found [F (8, 379) = 30.43, p< 0.001], with R^2
of 0.39. The participants predicted that social isolation is equal to: 7.73 + 0.07(sociopolitical
outlook)+0.45(piety level)+0.08(not using modern technology)+0.12(god
importance)+0.04(family conservatism)+0.20(anti-secular education)+0.12(cultural
religiosity)+0.98(country as fundamentalism indicator), with changing intervals within each
variable, indicating level of religious fundamentalism. The most significant predictors were
of piety level and country of origin as fundamentalism indicator. This model predicted 39%
of the variance.

Regression post factor analysis
As noted previously, a factor analysis was conducted to be sure that the computed
variables were sound. By conducting a multivariate regression calculation on PSPP with the
new variables of ‘Piety’ and ‘Dawah’, the following improved results were obtained. (see
Appendix ‘C’ for factor analysis process). Based on these results, the original ‘Piety’ variable
was broken into two factors, and a second model was run to reflect this.
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A significant regression equation was found [F (9, 378) = 28.18, p< 0.001], with R^2
presenting a slightly better fit of 0.40. It shows that ‘Dawah’ is among the most significant
predictors, along with piety level, culture as religiosity indicator, and country of origin as
fundamentalism indicator. The lower significance of variables associated with sociopolitical
outlooks and secular education indicates a generally encouraging image of democratic values
among Muslim communities in the U.S.

The next stage of the statistical test was the incorporation of the two control variables,
anti-Muslim sentiment and strain. By conducting a multivariate regression calculation on
PSPP, the following results were obtained.
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By incorporating the control variables in the regression the model improves slightly
(R^2=0.42) but the review of the independent effect of the variables is telling that antiMuslim sentiment is definitely occurring but is not a significant factor in “contributing” to
social isolation among Muslims post 9/11. Strain, however, significantly increases levels of
social isolation and corresponds with core principles of subcultural theory (p<0.01). Possibly,
the disjunction between America’s social goals and legitimate means to achieve them adds up

42

with the cultural gaps experienced by Muslim immigrants. ‘Dawah’ remains a significant
predictor of social isolation in this model, where as ‘Piety’ does not.

Lastly, the model was run again using only male respondents because this reflects the
characteristics of a potential Islamic terrorism perpetrator (Bakker, 2006). Accordingly, the
data were examined for male respondents only, using a gender affiliation filter. The following
results were obtained.
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This was the model with the greatest fit (R^2=0.45). Also, ‘Piety’ is now significant
in the model for male only. A significant regression equation was found [F (11, 426) = 31.16,
p< 0.001], with R^2 of 0.45. The participants predicted that social isolation is equal to: 6.990.14(sociopolitical outlook)+0.23(not using modern technology)-0.12(god
importance)+0.04(family conservatism)+0.18(anti-secular education)+0.39(cultural
religiosity)+0.92(country as fundamentalism indicator)+0.29(piety level)
+0.44(Dawah)+0.07(anti-Muslim sentiment)+0.22(strain level), with changing intervals
within each variable, indicating level of religious fundamentalism. The factors to become the
most significant predictors to social isolation with the filter of males only are culture of
religiosity indicator, country of origin as fundamentalism indicator, piety level, Dawah, and
strain level. According to these results, there is a significant relation between religious
fundamentalism and social isolation of Muslims in the U.S.
In order to illustrate the level of sense of social isolation among Muslims in the U.S.,
the following statistical distribution of social isolation was obtained.
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With a mean score of 15.32 and a maximum score of 22.00 out of 28 intervals, it
shows that there is a relatively positive assimilation of Muslims in the U.S., despite the harms
of 9/11 on that manner. Along with a deep interpretation to what is shown in the Results
chapter, the implications of this distribution will be elaborated later in the next chapter of
Discussion, emphasizing on the higher rates of Islamic terrorism in Europe with comparison
to the U.S., when assimilation and social isolation serve as the central explanation.
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V: Discussion

Model of religious terrorism

Essentially, the model extracted from this study is built on the principles that (1)
social isolation due to (2) religious fundamentalism leads to (3) radicalization, as (4)
intellectual ideas as “Dawah” are embedded within the (5) subculture’s social norms. That (6)
environment serves as a fertile ground for next level of (7) jihad – extreme violence and
terrorism, (8) enacted by the extreme part in the subculture. In the U.S. this process of
homegrown Islamic terrorism is “blocked” or mitigated thanks to positive assimilation.

Terrorism, as means to a political end, could be caused inter alia by (1) a mobilizing
agenda and (2) an allowing social formation. The aspiration to impose the agenda holds a
large stake in the use of intimidation and an extreme violence. All the more so, when that
agenda is based on fundamental religious ideas which call explicitly to use of lethal force. As
for the social formation, the criminological theory of subculture proves the high potential for
a group of minorities to commit crimes as an opposition to the dominant society, depends on
the level of isolation. A focused research on the role of cultural differences, and specifically
Muslim communities in Western societies, shows an undisputed correspondence with the
core principals of subcultural theory and processes of radicalization.

The literature shows that in the case of Islamic fundamentalism, the paths to
radicalization resulted in extreme violence and terrorism can alternatively go through a
"peaceful" path to lay the groundwork to the use of actual violence. That is mostly by the
intellectual element of "Dawah". As demonstrated in the literature review in the discussion
over Dawah, it is essentially an Islamist practice for a violent jihad by different tactics.
Differently put, the vulnerability of a subculture characterized by religious practices to prone
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to extremism, due to substantial differences and isolation from the dominant society, depends
on the level of its fundamentalism. The fundamental practice of Dawah, which significantly
increases social isolation, connects to the setting of social isolation as a proxy measure to the
potential of radicalization and terrorism.

For its strong relation to an outgroup hostility (i.e. the extremist part in the subculture
and therefore the criminological element), religious fundamentalism serves as a nourishing
environment to radicalization/ extremization through intellectual and socio-political paths.
The mobilization of religious fundamentalism with practices such as Dawah increases the
social isolation of the subculture, keeps it away from the general society’s values, and
increases its outgroup radicalization and hostility as a result. Terrorism is then the tool to
express the agenda behind the fundamental religious practices. In the case of Islamic
terrorism, the agenda is the imposition of an Islamic state everywhere, regardless of the
general culture and political views.

Hypothesis examination
Major findings from this study’s statistical analyses present how religious
fundamentalism plays a substantial role in the social isolation of a group of minorities in the
U.S. Multiple variables of religious fundamentalism show a clear sense of conservatism
among Muslims in America. That sense is indicated both by technical and behavioral factors.
Technical factors such as the country of origin and cultural roots influence the individual’s
general outlook on political and social issues. More importantly, the findings show that this
sense is carried by daily behavioral factors such as piety, and absolute and fundamental
recognition with Islam - explained as ‘Dawah’.
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The null hypothesis of this study asserted that there is no significant association
between religious fundamentalism and social isolation of Muslims in the U.S. That
hypothesis was reached with the understanding that under the framework of subcultural
theory, the proxy measure to how religious fundamentalism can be translated to extreme
violence should be the level of isolation of the subjected group of minorities from the
dominant society. With a greater isolation, there is a greater chance of opposition and
criminality. Under an extreme Islamist agenda, that isolation of a fundamental Muslim
community can result in violent actions against the dominant society. The results presented a
significant association between the indicators of religious fundamentalism and social
isolation. The null hypothesis was then tested and rejected. Piety, Dawah, and cultural factors
are found to be among the most significant indicators of religious fundamentalism, especially
for males. Along with factors of religious fundamentalism, Strain was found as a significant
predictor of social isolation as well, appropriates with core principles of the subcultural
theory.

Further, it was found that the relative assimilation of Muslims in the U.S. appears to
be positive, resulting in mild levels of social isolation and possibly the relatively low levels of
Islamic terrorism incidents with a comparison to other western societies (e.g. western Europe
and Israel). Hypothetically, it can be assumed that the correlation works vice versa when the
social isolation is the IV and affects levels of religious fundamentalism. This hypothesis
should be tested with a different statistical test than multivariate regression (e.g. binary
regression), using the constructed data for this current study.

It is likely to analyze that the probability for an extreme-oriented group of people
should be measured by the rates of its violent acts per se. However, this study presented how
extremism can be reached by absolutism in religious practices and the uncompromising belief
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that they should be spread everywhere, regardless of cultural and political settings, as part of
its imposition. Dawah, the Islamic missionary practice, significantly appears to be carried
among Muslim communities in the U.S. In an open-minded society, such as the American
one, the potential for a conflict is probably high. Dawah, therefore, can serve as a pull factor
to a social isolation and extreme violence, as a result of opposition to the dominant western
values in the U.S. Moreover, it can also play as a push factor since the American society
would reject the ideas of the Islamic missionary.

Similar to Dawah by nature but different by practice, Piety level among Muslims in
the U.S. also significantly appears to be associated with their level of social isolation.
Justification to banning of alcohol drinking, premarital sex, homosexuality, and strict
opposition to abortion under any circumstances, are fundamental Islamic practices that
conflict with the American society’s consensus and increase levels of social isolation. It
seems though, that with the positive trend of assimilation of Muslims in the U.S., those strict
practices are to be reduced in the future and aligned with the general society’s values.

According to the literature, this trend is decreasingly dependent on waves of
immigration from more fundamentalist countries and the popularity of global fundamentalist
Islamic groups’ activity carried by globalization. The trend increasingly depends on the
positive ‘Americanization’ process of Muslim immigrants and secularity compared to their
counterparts in the countries of origin. While anti-Muslim sentiment post 9/11 could be
another explanation for how Muslim piety is negatively perceived by the American society
and therefore practiced even more as a “backlash effect”, this study’s findings show an
appearance of this phenomenon, but not as significant as other factors.

On the other hand, the findings on the control variable of Strain significance, as a
factor of social isolation, shows that the theoretical framework of subculture was an
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appropriate one for the purposes of this study. The classic approach to analyze strain is
usually by how far the gap is between the financial goals set by the society, and the legitimate
means in the disposal of the individual to achieve them. In this current study subject,
additional aspects of strain are emphasized. The approach to strain in this study is more by
the disjunction between other general values in the American society and the Muslim
communities’ fundamental values. When applied to a group setting, that disjunction serves as
a coefficient to the “strength” of a subculture. Therefore, the strain in this study is not only a
control variable, but it also completes the model of a social isolation associated by adding up
to factors of religious fundamentalism, or cultural gaps.

Potential contribution
This current study’s potential contribution is the understanding of the relationship
between intellectual processes that derive from fundamental religious practices with the
potential to become radical, and the socio-political environment which affects a potential
perpetrator(s). The outcomes of this current study are important to both security policies and
social aspects in Western societies. The understanding of the root motivations of potential
perpetrators is essential for the formation of proper counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency
strategies and tactics. Furthermore, it is essential to receive a current status of the
phenomenon in order to advise adequately to decision-makers on the more strategical level.

The research question of this current study subsequently aims to discover if the
religious practices of members of Muslim communities living in a Western society are a
significant motivator in a potential support of a terror network on the individual level. With
regards to social and environmental factors, the research question aims to understand the
potential of formation of such networks from first place. This study discusses and make
distinctions on the differences and relations between moderate, cultural, fundamentalist and
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extreme levels of religious practices. Therefore, the research findings can also contribute to
the conversation regarding the most likely unjustified generalization of Muslims in light of
recent terroristic attacks characterized by radical Islamist actors.
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VI: Policy implications

It is in the core values of the U.S. to allow freedom of worship to anyone from any
religion. It is also in the highest interests of the U.S. to address any risk of terrorism or seeds
to terrorism by any means necessary. This chapter on Policy implications will not discuss
policies of preventing nor limiting individuals or groups from practicing their religion under
any circumstances. Furthermore, this chapter will not introduce recommendations on the
operational and tactical levels of counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency. Policies on the
micro level are expected to be constructed by the respective law enforcement agencies, in
accordance with the proper considerations between civil liberties and crime control (reactive
and preventive). The following policy implications will discuss mostly social issues in the
attempt to sustain a free environment for worship, along with creation of a collective and selfidentification with the American general society’s values, including its democratic principles.

Any macro policy made on the issue of homegrown religious terrorism prevention
should be derived from the strategic principle of preventing fundamentalism from becoming
extremism. Fundamentalism, as a very conservative form of religion practice, cannot and
should not be lawfully limited. However, the fine line crossing between fundamentalism to
extremism should be detected and widened. The practical tools to achieving that strategic
goal are via the educational systems; more liberal family values (e.g. status of women); data
collection and intelligence on global trends of Islamist movements; measurement of
democratic values embedded in Muslim communities; monitoring of anti-Muslim sentiment
across America; periodical joint conversations and agreements between religious leaders
from all faiths in the American society; rigorous studies to present current status on issues of
religious fundamentalism and critical social isolationism. In other words, the strategy is to
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incorporate democratic values along with the religious values and by that to reduce
separatism and social isolation.

The findings in this study suggest that in the U.S. the relatively positive assimilation
of Muslims serve as a defense mechanism to extremism. Most efforts in the policy should be
invested in the maintenance of that mechanism by strengthening even more positive
overviews (e.g. sociopolitical issues, family liberalism and secular education). Other
measures should be taken on the extents of intercultural cooperation in the American society,
monitoring of external influencers which trigger extremism, and periodical sampling of
religious fundamentalism association with social isolation. The following table suggest
examples for measures to be taken on those issues.

Issue

Measures
•

Education

•
•
•
•

Sociopolitical

•

•

•

Outcome(s)

As part of a “successful assimilation program”, the •
incorporation of mandatory secular contents in all
educational systems is essential.
Schools with a clear religious orientation will be
monitored on balances between religious and secular
studies.
•
Low scores in national standardized tests will be
•
subjected to auditing of the school’s curriculum.
Contents of hate or incitement against any race,
nation, or religion will be subjected to punitive
•
measures against the educational institution.
Optional studies on other religions will be offered in
schools, under the review of state/ federal
educational authorities.
In order to measure sustainable democratic values •
among any group of immigrants, it is recommended
to monitor percentage of voting in local/ state/ and •
presidential elections.
In Muslim communities is the U.S., it is
recommended to conduct surveys regarding the
•
relevance of Shari’a laws in the U.S. as the law of
the land.
One strong finding in this current study is the
opposition to the state of Israel among Muslim
communities in the U.S. (variables C36D, H2, H3).
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Democratic values will be embedded within every
American resident from a young age, reducing
chances of political subcultures and violent
opposition to the general society including
governmental institutions.
Religious educational contents will not be harmed
and will balance with secular contents.
Trends of incitement and proneness to extremism
will be diminished in early stages.
Promotion of mutual understanding of different
cultures, diminishing of ignorance, development of
tolerance.

% of voting in democratic elections will indicate
compliance with core democratic principles.
Level of adherence of Shari’a as law of the land
instead of democracy will indicate absolutism to
extreme Islamic extreme agendas.
Findings regarding Israel’s right to exist can
illuminate on the opinion about America’s support of
Israel and its actions as the only democracy in the
Middle-East.

It should be researched why their opinion on this
subjected is way far than the American consensus.

Family

•

•

Intercultural cooperation

•
•

External influencers

•

•

Research

•

•

Encouragement of women employment and higher •
education should be advocated by governmental
institutions. High percentage below the national
average should be inquired.
•
Surveys on justification to homosexuality should be
conducted yearly.
An investigative approach must be taken on
incidents of “honorable murders” or violence.
An honest and transparent dialogue is a key in a
•
diverse democratic society. Democratic values
should be the leading narrative in any community in •
the U.S. Creation of a state level “Cultural Leaders
Council” will promote unity and sense of American
identity. The Council will be composed by Imams,
Rabbis, and Ministers, and will have a rotating
•
chairmanship. The Council will discuss promotion
of transparency between communities, democratic
values, American identity, and will sign petitions on
the subjects.
Isolated fundamental communities have high
•
sensitivity to international trends affiliated with the
subjected set of beliefs. Global trends originated in •
countries with a strong Islamist orientation (e.g. ISIL
from Iraq) should be monitored and analyzed with
respect to affecting Muslim communities in the U.S.
Any immigrant, a man of religion, or asylum seeker •
from extremist-oriented country should be
investigated (not automatically banned) by the
Department of State.

More liberal family values will bring fundamental
communities closer to the American social
consensus and will reduce social isolationism.
Severe punitive approach towards “honorable
crimes” as often practices in fundamental
communities will create deterrence and discourage
extremism.

Evidence Based Practice (EBP) study should be
•
conducted every 3 years. The study will be fully
funded by the government. The study will sample
religious communities in the 5 most populated
•
districts in the U.S. The study will produce a
planned change on the issues of (1) social isolation
due to religious fundamentalism, (2) levels of strain
among groups of minorities, (3) American identity •
among groups of minorities, (4) anti-Muslim
sentiment.
The EBP studies will be based on the principles of
the model of religious terrorism suggested in the
Discussion chapter of this current study.

Tactical and operational measures for policy makers,
law enforcement agencies and practitioners on
counter-insurgency and social differences.
Elimination of secondary factors to social
isolationism (e.g. anti-Muslim sentiment, Strain) to
allow focusing on core factors such as of piety and
Dawah.
Comprehensive model to cope with seeds of
religious terrorism in the U.S.
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Isolationism will reduce with better interaction
between communities.
Fine lines crossing between fundamentalism to
extremism will become blurred with values other
than scriptural being also in the census of a religious
community.
“Contracts” between community leaders will create
commitment to social values at least as religious
ones.

Reduction of chances to mobilize extremist agendas/
plotting of religious terror attacks.
Awareness of authorities to sensitive issues among
Muslim communities or conflicts due to
identification with some of the ideas carried by
Islamist actors overseas.
Civil investigation will provide information on the
intentions of the individual in America. Any conflict
with core American democratic values will be
subjected to review.

VII. Conclusion

The crime of terror has been challenging security systems, policymakers, and scholars
for decades. For its multi-faced nature and ambiguity in definition, the issue of terrorism must
be broken down and learnt to its different elements and types. This current study focused on
the phenomenon of religious terrorism, and Islamic terrorism in the U.S. in particular. Islamic
terrorism is waging war on the western society during the last few decades, when the
exclamation point so far was the devastating attacks of 9/11. Since then there were countless
attempts to analyze the motivations and drivers to terrorize in the name of God, in effort to
predict such attacks from home and abroad, on the individual and the group levels.

While most studies on the topic focused either on aspects of religiosity that leads to
intellectual radicalization, or political differences due to isolationism of a group of minorities,
this current study asserted that level of religiosity (i.e. religious fundamentalism) leads to
social isolationism, from which the way to radicalization becomes more imminent. Therefore,
the research question of “How Muslim religious fundamentalism is associated with social
isolation of Muslims in the United States?” was set for this study.

In order to analyze how religious fundamentalism affects social isolation, if at all, it
was vital to find out what is Islamic fundamentalism, how it is a fertile ground to extremism
that fits Islamist agendas, and how it differs from western social value – in the U.S. in
particular. Moreover, it was important to frame the social isolation as a proxy measure to
radicalization and proneness to terrorism under a criminological theory. For the central
element of a cultural group’s social isolation in it, the theory of sub-culture was found as the
fittest theoretical framework.
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The literature review over the issue of Islamic religious fundamentalism, has revealed
important elements such as the aspirations to impose a global Islamic state under the Shari’a
as the law of the land. The struggle to achieve that goal goes through jihad, being it a violent
or non-violent one, depends on the time. As demonstrated by Schmid (2014) and other
scholars, practices as Dawah, a peaceful but intense teaching of Islam, are not merely a
routine of religious practice, but an appropriation of tactics before the next level of a violent
jihad. The extremist outcome of the fundamentalist practice of Dawah, under an allowing
environment, is an extreme violence. Therefore, level of social isolation of Muslims in
western societies is a crucial element in the potential of jihad actualization.

In accordance with the research question and literature review findings, social
isolation of Muslin communities was statistically examined with factors of religious
fundamentalism as predictors. Using data from the DAAS 2003 survey that were recoded and
constructed, factors of religious fundamentalism among the post-9/11 Arab community of
Detroit were tested on how they associated with that community’s social isolation from the
general American society. The statistical tests of multivariate linear regression have
yielded proof of significant association between the levels of religious fundamentalism
and social isolationism. The factor of Piety was among the most significant factors along all
of the regression tests. After a factor analysis, it was found that Dawah is another significant
factor to the association of Muslims’ social isolation. Strain and anti-Muslim sentiment were
set as control variables to indicate Muslims’ social isolation. While the latter was found as a
mild indicator in the American society, strain is a significant factor to social isolation and
also compliments factors of cultural differentiation. Overall, with a regression model of nine
independent variables of religious fundamentalism (technical and behavioral), two control
variables, and a dependent variable of social isolation, a significant regression equation was
found with R^2 of 0.45.
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The significant results allowed a creation of a model of a religious terrorism,
composed by the principles of (1) social isolationism due to (2) religious fundamentalism
caused by (3) radicalization due to (4) intellectual processes allowed by (5) subculture’s
alternative social norms with (6) environment as a fertile ground for (7) extreme violence and
terrorism, (8) enacted by the extreme part in the subculture. The findings on a relatively
positive social isolation of Muslims in the U.S. serve as an explanation to the low rates of
religious terrorism incidents with comparison to Europe or Israel.

Finally, for the purpose of expressing policy implications to address the risk of
religious terrorism in the U.S. on the macro level, the leading strategical principle will be
preventing fundamentalism from becoming extremism. In a complex society such as the U.S.
the sensitive issues of religious identity on one hand, and national security on the other, must
be addressed carefully but firmly. Therefore, measures of prevention must be taken with
bringing religiously fundamental communities closer to the American cultural and social
census. Simultaneously, there should be no compromise on the monitoring of potential
influential risks from countries known as extremist-oriented. In particular to the Muslim
community in the U.S., positive aspects of secular education and overall political outlook
should be strengthened even more. Innovative initiations such as official intercultural
councils and EBP studies on the topic of social isolationism are ought to immensely
contribute to reduction of extremism and social differentiations in the U.S.
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Appendix ‘A’ - Summary of work by the authors of DAAS 2003:
“The Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS), 2003, a companion survey to the 2003 Detroit
Area Study (DAS), using a representative sample (DAS, n = 500) drawn from the threecounty Detroit metropolitan area and an oversample of Arab Americans (DAAS, n = 1000)
from the same region, provides a unique dataset on September 11, 2001, and its impacts on
Arab Americans living in the Detroit metropolitan area. The data contain respondent
information concerning opinions on their experiences since the September 11, 2001, attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, social trust, confidence in institutions,
intercultural relationships, local social capital, attachments to transnational communities,
respondent characteristics, and community needs. Examples of the issues addressed in the
data include frequency of religious participation, level of political activism, level of
interaction with people outside of their cultural, racial, and ethnic groups, and the quality of
the social and political institutions in their area. Background information includes birth
country, citizenship status, citizenship status of spouse, education, home ownership status,
household income, language spoken in the home (if not English), marital status, number of
children (under 18) in the household, parents' countries of birth and citizenship status,
political affiliation, total number of people living in the household, voter registration status,
whether the respondent ever served in the United States Armed Forces, and year of
immigration, if not born in the United States.”

http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/4413?q=daas+2003#matchingV
ars
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Appendix ‘B’ – DAAS 2003 QUESTIONNAIRE

http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgibin/file?comp=none&study=4413&ds=1&file_id=889124&path=ICPSR
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Appendix ‘C’ – ‘Piety’ factor analysis
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The factor analysis to the original ‘Piety’ variable has yielded two component factors.
The rotated component matrix shows that alcohol, premarital sex, abortion, and
homosexuality are loading together.

In order to reassure that the new ‘Piety’ variable is composed by the most appropriate
sub-variables (i.e. the factors), a factor analysis was conducted for it as well.

The rotated component matrix indicates that all 4 variables load into 1 column,
consisting one factor component.
The same process of factor analysis was conducted for the new variable ‘Dawah’ as
well. In this case also, the rotated component matrix shows that all 3 variables load into 1
column, consisting one factor component.
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